10.5 SOUTHWEST GEORGIA TORNADO OUTBREAK OF 13-14
FEBRUARY 2000:
AN OVERVIEW
Kenneth J. Gould , T.J. Turnage, Jeffrey D. Fournier, Andrew I. Watson, Robert C. Goree, Ronald L. Block, and Martin C. Trexler
NOAA/National Weather Service
Tallahassee, Florida
1. INTRODUCTION
Beginning Sunday evening, February 13, and continuing into
the early morning hours of Monday, February 14th, WFO Tallahassee
issued 51 warnings. These included 25 tornado, 23 severe thunderstorm, and 3
special marine warnings. During this time, warnings were issued for four deadly
tornadoes, which caused the loss of 18 lives in three southwest Georgia
Counties, an event unequaled in south Georgia in nearly 50 years.
This paper will briefly discuss the environment in which these storms
developed, as well as the storms themselves. The paper will concentrate on the
assessment of the damage these storms inflicted, showing storm and damage
tracks. Office performance will also be evaluated. This paper is a companion
paper to Turnage et al. (2000), which examines the WSR-88D Mesocyclone
Detection and Tornado Detection Algorithm characteristics during the tornado
outbreak episode.
A strong moist low-level flow had developed in advance of an
approaching cold front. A 100-kt digging jetstreak was observed dropping into
the base of a negatively tilted trough aloft. A 50 to 60-kt low-level jet was
present, along with a significant vertical shear profile, and ample CAPE. Thus
the necessary and sufficient ingredients were in place for severe convective
development late on the evening of 13-14 February 2000 in southwest Georgia.
Based upon surveys, interviews, and radar analysis, there appear to
have been four "killer" tornadoes that struck southwest Georgia.
Preliminary surveys had suggested three tornadoes. A map of the affected area
and tornado tracks are shown in Fig. 1. To put the map in prospective, the
Florida-Georgia border runs near but just off the bottom of Fig. 1.
Interstate-75 is located along the right side of the display.
3.1 Camilla Tornadoes
The first Camilla tornadic storm came ashore from the Gulf of Mexico
in extreme southwest Bay County, Florida, at approximately 0130 (all times
UTC). The cell rapidly developed a circulation and became Supercell #1. The
storm was responsible for extensive straight line wind damage in extreme
northern Bay County around 0200 and southwestern Washington County around 0215,
before continuing across the northeastern Florida Panhandle into Jackson
County. It weakened slightly as it crossed Lake Seminole at 0400, which is the
dividing line between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Supercell #1 then rapidly
regained strength across Seminole County, Georgia. It become tornadic at 0442
near Branchville, Georgia in Mitchell County (Figs. 1 and 2) and remained
tornadic (F3) as it passed just south of Camilla before dissipating around
0505. This tornado was responsible for 10 deaths in a mobile home subdivision
near Camilla.
The second Camilla tornadic supercell developed in western Seminole
County at 0430. Supercell #2 can be observed in Fig. 2 to the southwest of
Supercell #1 as the next major area of reflectivity. This supercell ultimately
developed a circulation as intense as that of Supercell #1. Ironically, it
followed almost the same track as the first Camilla tornado, and may have
become tornadic as early as 0529.
Aerial and ground surveys were unable to resolve an individual track
associated with this tornado because it overlapped the track of the first.
Interviews with survivors and rescue crews seem to corroborate the existence of
this tornado. One death is now attributed to this tornado, in the same mobile
home subdivision that was struck by the first tornado. An aerial photo (Fig. 3)
shows the devastation of the mobile home subdivision. The center of the first
Camilla tornado path can be seen from left to right in the center of the
picture. The single fatality occurred approximately 250 m south of the first
tornado apparently near the lower right of the photo (Fig. 3).
Turnage et al. (2000) discusses the
strong evidence of the existence of a second Camilla tornado. The authors know
of no reports of "training" tornadoes from separate mesocyclones such
as this having occurred before. The 9.3-mile damage swath of the first Camilla
tornado is shown in Fig. 4. Fujita scale damage assessments are also shown
along the track. The short dashed line south of Camilla represents the only
known probable touchdown point of the second Camilla tornado. Radar analyses,
however, imply other possible touchdown locations (Turnage et al. (2000).
3.2 Supercell
#3
Supercell #3 also developed in southern Seminole County,
Georgia, at about 0500. The storm developed on the heels of Supercell #2,
exhibiting TVS signatures as it moved rapidly across Decatur County into Grady
County. It became tornadic around 0549, approximately 10 miles north of Cairo,
and then passed along the northern outskirts of Meigs, Georgia at 0600. By far,
the longest tornado track (14.5 miles) belongs to the Grady County tornado
(Fig. 5). The tornado, rated F3, killed six people.
The mesocyclone weakened and the tornado dissipated northeast of Meigs.
However, it reintensified at 0621 just west of Moultrie, Georgia, in Colquitt
County, and became tornadic again around 0639 as it passed near Crosland and
Omega, Georgia. The Omega tornado was rated F2, and produced one fatality in
Colquitt County near Crosland. Tha damage track (Fig. 6) was approximately 6
miles in length.
During the event, eight personnel handled office functions,
five forecasters, two hydrometeorological technicians (HMTs), and one
HAM/SKYWARN volunteer operator. Work was divided between a coordinator, who
directed office operations, two forecasters who maintained a metwatch over
radar and warnings, one forecaster who performed normal public, aviation, and
short-term forecasting duties, and two individuals who answered telephones,
coordinated with emergency management, and assessed preliminary damage reports.
One HMT monitored NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) functions, as the office had just
converted over to the new Console Replacement System (CRS) two days prior to
the event. As the outbreak developed, the WFO staff performed in an outstanding
manner, under very stressful and rapidly-changing conditions. The key to their
success included preparation, the ability to anticipate developments, and their
skill in using the new technology (e.g., AWIPS, WarnGen, etc.) to quickly and
accurately identify the developing supercells which ultimately produced the
killer tornadoes. Despite the fact that 51 county and marine warnings were
issued in the space of only a few hours, warning lead times for the most
dangerous storms were impressive, including 24 minutes for the first Camilla
tornado, 39 minutes for the second Camilla tornado, 10 minutes for the Grady
County storm, and 20 minutes for the Colquitt County storm. Of the 25 county
tornado warnings issued, 16 warnings verified with an average lead time of 32
minutes. Figure 7 summarizes the tornado statistics for the event. It also
compares the Tallahassee WFO with national as well as other NWS Southern Region
offices.
The Southwest Georgia tornado outbreak struck during the late night and
early morning hours. "You couldn't ask for any worse time for a tornado to
strike", said Robbie Hopkins, assistant coordinator of Mitchell County's
Emergency Management Agency. By far the most critical aspect of warning
operations is to make individuals aware that they are in danger, far enough
ahead of time so that they can take protective action. In this instance,
notification of the potential for severe weather took place over 15 hours in
advance with the issuance of a Hazardous Weather Outlook at 6 AM EST on
February 13.
Later in the day, the WFO Tallahassee forecasters coordinated with the
Storm Prediction Center, the scenario was discussed, and follow-up calls lead
to the issuance of a Tornado Watch nearly six hours prior to the deadly
tornadoes. Additional WFO staff were called in to deal with the expected outbreak.
It is particularly noteworthy that several staff members, alerted to the
potential for severe weather during the WFO routine daily coordination briefing
on the previous Friday morning, voluntarily called the office and arranged to
come in to help prepare for and "work the event". The SKYWARN network
was activated, and the Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) coordinator was
notified. Arrangements were made for an operator to come to the WFO, activate
the office amateur radio station (WX4TAE), and begin collecting real-time
reports from amateur radio volunteer spotters. The information he relayed to
the WFO team during the event was crucial, and was utilized in statements to
emphasize the deadly nature of the storm.
The success in this event is a credit to the personnel at the
Tallahassee WFO. The office had "spun-up" to WFO status in November
1999, which included new responsibilities such as public and marine forecasts.
The newly-installed Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS) was
in commissioning test mode at the time of the outbreak. The new technology was
critical to the timeliness of the warnings. The ability to examine 3 to 4
radars simultaneously was extremely important. The warning software package,
WarnGen, had just been localized and tailored for the region in December. The
NWR CRS system had only been commissioned several days before. Had it not been
for the performance and superb teamwork exhibited by the WFO staff, working
together to correctly identify and track the developing storms, and then issue
exceptionally accurate warnings with long lead times, many more lives would
undoubtedly have been lost.
Turnage, T.J., R.R. Lee, and E. D. Mitchell, 2000: WSR-88D mesocyclone
characteristics of selected thunderstorms during the southwest Georgia tornado
outbreak. Preprints,
20th Conference on Severe Local Storms, Orlando, FL, Amer.
Meteor. Soc.

Fig. 1. Tornado tracks
associated with the 13-14 February 2000 Southwest Georgia Tornado Outbreak.
Dotted lines are county borders.

Fig. 2. WSR-88D reflectivity display at 0436 UTC, 14 February 2000. Camilla
Supercell #1 is located in western Mitchell County (center of image). Camilla
Supercell #2 is developing in Seminole County (two counties to the southwest).

Fig. 3. Aerial photo of Camilla mobile home subdivision.

Fig. 4. Surveyed damage track (9.3
miles) for the Camilla tornadoes. F-scale damage and fatality locations
(circled numbers) are also displayed. Short line marks only known touchdown
point of second Camilla tornado.

Fig. 5. Surveyed damage track
(14.5 miles) of the Grady County tornado. F-scale damage and fatality locations
(circled numbers) are displayed.

Fig. 6. Surveyed damage track
(6 miles) of the Omega tornado. F-scale damage and fatality location (circled
number) are displayed.

Fig. 7. Tornado statistics
for this case compared to National, Southern Region, and Tallahassee WFO for
1999.